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Abstract:  
Collective self-determination is considered to be an important political value. Many liberal political 
philosophers appeal to it to defend the right of states to exclude would-be newcomers. In this paper, I 
challenge the value of collective self-determination in the case of countries like the US, former colonial 
powers with a history of white supremacist immigration and citizenship policies. I argue for my claim by 
way of an analogy: There is no value to white neighborhoods in the US, which are the result of racist 
attitudes and state policies, determining autonomously who should become a neighbor. In light of this 
commitment, defenders of the US's right to exclude would need to explain why it should be of moral 
value that a community whose character and composition has been shaped by white supremacy be able 
to determine its membership on its own terms. 

1. Introduction 
Sarah Fine has recently argued that the “shameful history of immigration controls” should make 
us worry that such controls are “inherently, inexorably racist” (Fine, 2016, p. 133). In light of this 
history, can political philosophers defend a right of states to exclude would-be immigrants 
without implicitly defending discriminatory practices? With Fine’s challenge in mind, I want to 
discuss a central premise in many liberal defenses of the right to exclude: the claim that 
collective self-determination is of moral value. Michael Walzer (1983) and David Miller (2005), 
for example, have each argued that the right to determine who ought to be admitted as a new 
member of the community is an important aspect of the collective self-determination of a 
political community. Consequently, they argue that political communities ought to have 
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discretion over whom to admit to their territory and whom to make a member. The idea of 
collective self-determination has a lot of pedigree; it is a fundamental (if vague) principle in 
international law and it plays an important role in liberal political thought, as it is arguably 
based on the the idea that legitimate political authority derives from “the people.” In this paper, 
I challenge the idea that collective self-determination––at least with respect to the community’s 
membership––is always valuable. 

I am going to focus my attention on the US, a past and present colonial power with a long 
history of white supremacist immigration and citizenship policies (see Mendoza 2014, Munishi 
2016). In a case like that, I argue, collective self-determination with respect to membership is 
not at all valuable. To make my case, I develop an analogy with the history of residential 
segregation in the US. Liberal political philosophers ought to agree that there is no value to 
predominantly white neighborhoods in the US, which are the result of white supremacist 
practices and state policies in the past, determining their “membership.” Analogously, in the 
case of countries whose current civic boundaries have been shaped by racist immigration and 
citizenship policies, self-determination of membership will tend to reinforce white supremacy, 
even if the current membership criteria are not explicitly racist. As a result, it is not a value that 
defenders of the right to exclude can appeal to.

2. Walzer’s Neighborhood Analogy and the History of Segregation in the US 
To explore the analogy, it will be useful to first consider Michael Walzer’s (1983) use of the 
neighborhood analogy in his well-known defense of the right to exclude. Walzer considers 
three potential analogies to states in his defense: neighborhoods, clubs, and families. Walzer 
argues that liberal democratic societies are most similar to clubs: They are free to make their 
own admission decisions in accordance with the shared understanding of the character of their 
community. They are like families insofar as they have an obligations towards the relatives of 
citizens or nationals who reside outside of the borders of the country. But, Walzer argues, 
countries are not like neighborhoods. 
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For Walzer, one important character of neighborhoods is that they do not have an organized 
and legally enforceable admissions policy. They might fail to be “welcoming” to newcomers, 
but they cannot eﬀectively exclude them. There are no institutional arrangements that are 
capable of maintaining the “ethnic purity” of a neighborhood (p. 36). In contrast to a club, a 
neighborhood is a merely random association whose composition is determined only by 
market forces. Thus, a “world of neighborhoods” (p. 37) would be one in which individuals 
could move about freely and choose to reside wherever they choose, constrained only by 
individual property claims. But for Walzer, a political community is a “world of common 
meanings” and shared “ways of life” which its members are entitled to preserve (p. 28). This 
world of common meanings requires closure, and since neighborhoods cannot be closed, we 
should not think of political communities as similar to neighborhoods.

I will not be addressing Walzer’s communitarian point directly. Instead, I want to dwell a little on 
the analogy itself. There are two oddities in Walzer’s construal of what a neighborhood is, 
especially in light of the US history of segregation. First, Walzer suggests that neighborhoods 
generally do not have “an organized or legally enforceable admissions policy” (p. 36). There 
are, he says further, “no institutional  arrangements capable of maintaining ‘ethnic’ 
purity” (ibid.). Walzer is clearly not unaware of the long history of racial segregation in the US; 
he explicitly refers to it when he points out that the state refuses to enforce restrictive 
covenants and acts to prevent or minimize discrimination in employment. The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and 1968, which aim to do the later, were passed less than 20 years before Walzer’s 
book appeared. Moreover, these legal changes have not eﬀectively ended residential 
segregation (Anderson 2010). In light of this history and its ongoing eﬀects, it seems odd to use 
the neighborhood, without any qualification, as a metaphor for a world without restrictions to 
movement.

The second oddity is that Walzer ignores the fact that neighborhoods, in contrast to clubs, are 
by their very nature place-based. A club as such does not involve an exclusive claim to a 
particular place. To use an example by Sarah Fine (2010): A yoga group that meets in Central 
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Park might be free to reject prospective members, but it cannot bar them from using Central 
Park. To exclude someone from a neighborhood, on the other hand, is to exclude them from 
access to a particular place. Similarly, immigrants usually seek access to a place that will 
provide suitable conditions for their livelihoods. Sure, they will seek access to a particular place 
because it will provide them with access to certain social networks and resources. But those 
resources and networks are themselves place-based, they cannot be accessed from just 
anywhere. Joining something like a mere club, without seeking access to specific places, is not 
usually what is at issue in debates about immigration. From this perspective, neighborhoods 
are much more like countries than clubs. 

The place-based nature of neighborhoods is central if we want to understand the harms of 
residential segregation in the US. Elizabeth Anderson (2010), for example, has laid out in great 
detail the social and material harms resulting from lack of access to employment, commercial 
and professional services, health care services, social and professional networks, etc. That 
access to social and material goods depends on what neighborhood one lives in indicates that 
neighborhoods are not simply “random associations” whose composition is determined solely 
by market processes. Predominantly white neighborhoods in the US are the product of white 
supremacy, understood as a social system designed to coercively extract social value from 
subordinated racialized groups and to secure its benefits for the dominant group (Mills, 1998). 
In the US, race plays a significant role in determining who can live in a particular neighborhood 
and these social boundaries were created (and in many cases are continued to be maintained) 
to perpetuate exploitative relations and maintain racial domination. 

At best then, Walzer’s neighborhood analogy is based on an ideal. Most US neighborhoods do 
not match this ideal by far. Even if we think that it is a worthy ideal to appeal to, it would be 
important to see it as the outcome of a painful moral learning process. Moreover, insofar as 
white communities did learn something about the wrong of segregation, they did not do so on 
their own, but only by being confronted by those whom they excluded. Because Walzer 
misrepresents the nature of neighborhoods in the US, his analogy does little to support his 
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argument for the right exclude. Indeed, as I will now go on to argue, attention to the history and 
current eﬀects of neighborhood segregation provides us with reasons against it.

3. The Value of Neighborhood Self-Determination  
Most liberal political theorists who argue from collective self-determination to a right to exclude 
explicitly reject discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnicity. However, even policies that 
are facially neutral with regard to race and ethnicity can work to perpetuate historical injustices 
and might have entirely foreseeable discriminatory consequences in a structurally unjust 
system (Fine, 2016). This means that self-determination, at least with respect to membership, 
is not valuable at all in the case of a country like the US.

Consider a predominately white, middle-class neighborhood in the US whose composition can 
be explained, in short, by white supremacy (i.e. it involves disproportionate access to 
resources, social hierarchy, and the illegitimate use of public power to maintain both). It may be 
obvious that a neighborhood cannot have a right to self-determination and/or that enforcing 
such a right would be infeasible. Moreover, I take it to be uncontroversial that this 
neighborhood should not be permitted to have formal or even informal admissions restrictions 
on racial or ethnic grounds. But we can still ask whether there would be some value to a 
neighborhood like this to exercise self-determination by determining its own composition, at 
least if it avoids racial discrimination. 

Suppose that the members of this neighborhood explicitly accept the prohibition of racial 
discrimination. They reject policies that make race a criterion for who can or cannot move to 
the neighborhood. At the same time, they do claim an important interest in collectively shaping 
the character of their community. One important aspect of that consists in being able to decide 
who becomes part of their neighborhood––as long as this does not involve racial or ethnic 
criteria. But otherwise, they believe that they should be able to use local government to control 
access to the neighborhood. For example, suppose they decide that they want to maintain the 
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quiet character of their neighborhood, and so while they are fine with new neighbors replacing 
old ones, they are against an influx of a large number of new residents into their neighborhood. 
They would use zoning restrictions and similar instruments in order to prevent the building of 
large-scale public housing in their neighborhood. They may or may not be aware that, for 
structural reasons, a disproportionate number of their potential new neighbors would be non-
white, but that is not the reason for their opposition. They simply do not want to a large number 
of new neighbors. In a case like this, is the ability of this neighborhood to determine its own 
composition of moral value?

Two considerations suggest we should answer in the negative: First, the history of segregated 
neighborhoods in the US includes a long period of active facilitation and enforcement of racial 
segregation by the government, followed by a period (arguably still ongoing) where informal 
social and economic processes perpetuate the eﬀects of earlier government-enforced 
segregation. Merely prohibiting the use of racial criteria in shaping the composition of 
neighborhoods is not suﬃcient to remedy the eﬀects of this history. Second, attending to this 
history would show neighbors that the very character of their predominately white 
neighborhood that they want to maintain––its composition, its aﬄuence, the access to goods 
and services it provides––are the result of this history. If they are committed to abolishing racial 
domination and exploitation, they cannot exclude the character of their own neighborhood 
from consideration as if it had nothing to do with it. 

We could draw the conclusion that the neighborhood community’s interest in self-
determination is outweighed by the harms of ongoing residential segregation. That is, while 
maintaining that there is value to communities determining their own composition, we can hold 
that the interest of community outsiders in having adequate access to social and material 
goods from which they have been unjustly excluded outweighs this value. But I think we should 
draw a stronger conclusion: We should not accord any weight to this community’s interest in 
determining their own composition. For one, the very character of the community that they 
want to preserve is a product of white supremacy. Its members may not explicitly endorse that 
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system. But insofar as they continue to benefit from its eﬀects and refuse to help remedy them, 
there also not making a clear break with an identity that they should, on reflection, consider 
abhorrent. Why then should we accord any moral weight to it? Moreover, the neighborhood 
residents would be mistaken if they thought that the character of their neighborhood is only of 
concern to them. White supremacy as a social system does not simply govern white 
neighborhoods from the inside, as it were. Rather, it uses neighborhoods boundaries as a way 
to police hierarchies and access to resources, i.e. to exercise power.  The residents of this 
neighborhood might say: “We just want to determine our own way of life.” But if this way of life 
is part of a system of exploitation and domination, even if those might be hidden from the sight 
of the current residents, we should not to accord any weight to their desire to maintain it.  
1
On this basis, we can sketch an analogy to the role of self-determination in arguments for the 
right of states like the US to exclude would-be immigrants. The US has a history of explicitly 
white supremacist admissions and citizenship policies (Mendoza, 2014; Munshi, 2016). 
Moreover, in the context of American expansion, colonialism, and imperialism, white 
supremacy understood as a global social system had, and continues to have, material eﬀects 
on both Americans and non-Americans. US immigrations policies have to be understood as 
part of the governance of a global empire, not just as internal policies (Munshi, 2016). It is no 
accident that modern systems of immigration control only really came about in the 19th and 
early 20th century––during the peak of Western colonialism and imperialism. The civic and 
territorial boundaries these policies set up helped to perpetuate exploitative relations and to 
secure its benefits for the dominant group.

A break with this history will require more than simply discontinuing explicit racist immigration 
policies, because doing just that will not actually remedy the harms and continuing material 
 This argument does not imply undue interference with the personal autonomy of current 1
residents. It does not justify forceful displacement. Nor does it interfere with the personal right 
of the current residents to associate or not to associate with whomever they want, in the 
privacy of their homes. However, their freedom of association does not give them the right to 
exclude others from a place like this neighborhood. Finally, current residents continue to have a 
voice in local aﬀairs, though of course they might now find themselves with others who have 
diﬀerent needs, interests, and maybe of diﬀerent vision of their shared life together.
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eﬀects of these policies. In light of this history, Americans––and arguably the citizens of many 
other Western countries––cannot understand the character and composition of their own 
political community as a merely neutral expression of our own history of self-governance. The 
“common meanings” and “ways of life” that we share (to use Walzer’s phrases) involve a 
history of exploitation and domination, and we continue to benefit from this history. If, based on 
our own understanding of the character and composition of our political community, we 
continue to unjustly burden others or refuse to remedy the historical injustices for which our 
political communities have been responsible, little or no weight should be accorded to our own 
claims to determine the character of our own communities. Collective self-determination, at 
least with respect to the composition of the community, is thus not always valuable. 

4. Conclusion  
Liberal political philosophers often aim to engage in general theorizing that abstract from 
historical contingencies. Thus, the claim that collective self-determination is an important value 
is usually asserted by many as a claim about political communities as such, or at least about 
legitimate or liberal ones. Arguments for this claim, for example those that suggest collective 
self-determination is important as an extension of individual autonomy (Stilz, 2016), are 
supposed to provide a universal basis for such claims. Here, I have argued that the concrete 
histories of states like the US and their role in setting up a global system of white supremacy 
should raise some doubt about the value of such communities determining their own 
membership. Defenders of the US's right to exclude would-be immigrant need to do more than 
provide abstract arguments for the value of self-determination as such; they need to explain 
why it should be of moral value that a community whose character and composition have been 
shaped by a global system of racial domination and exploitation be able to determine its own 
membership on its own terms. 

To support this claim, I argued that liberal political philosophers should already accept a similar 
line of argument in the case of white neighborhoods in the US that are the product of its long 
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history of racial segregation. Walzer’s ideal that neighborhoods ought not to have “an 
organized or legally enforceable admissions policy,” for example, needs to be understood in 
light of this history.

My argument leaves room for moral asymmetries when it comes to appeals to collective self-
determination. It may well be the case that while some political communities do not have a 
right to exclude would-be immigrants from membership or entry to their territory, others do. 
This might be the case for communities who have historically been, or continue to be, 
dominated and exploited by others, and for whom control over membership is necessary to 
prevent domination (see Young, 2000). Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that the principle of self-
determination––which has earned much of its current pedigree through its use by 
decolonization movements––is now being used to defend the right of Western states to keep 
out migrants, as if there were asking for the same thing as the colonized trying to throw oﬀ their 
oppressors.  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